Procedure or performance? Assessing citizen’s attitudes towards legitimacy in Swedish and Norwegian local government by Gustavsen, Annelin et al.
1 
 
Procedure or Performance? 
Assessing citizen’s attitudes towards legitimacy in Swedish and Norwegian local 
government 
 
Annelin Gustavsen a , Asbjørn Røiseland ,b and Jon Pierre c  
 
a Nordland Research Institute, Postboks 1490, N-8049 BODØ, tel. +47 755 17427, 
annelin.gustavsen@nforsk.no  
b  Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nordland, Postboks 1490, N-8049 BODØ, tel. 
+47 755 17624, asr@uin.no 
c Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 711, 405 30 SE-Gothenburg, 
tel.+46 (0) 31 786 49 73, jon.pierre@pol.gu.se 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
A common understanding prevails that political systems generate legitimacy by both democratic 
procedures and by performance in service production. With the increase of NPM-models in local 
services, some scholars argue that performance is becoming a more important source of legitimacy 
than conventional legitimacy originating from the procedural side of governance. The aim of the 
paper is to discuss and analyze the importance of, and relation between these sources of legitimacy. 
The paper examines three hypotheses: 1) the trade-off hypothesis, 2) the synergy hypothesis and 3) 
the independence hypothesis. Based on citizen surveys in Norway and Sweden, our analysis argues 
that the dimensions are synergetic. 
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1. Introduction 
Political systems at all institutional levels generate legitimacy from their capacity to provide 
democratic governance and from the services they deliver (Easton 1965; Scharpf 1999; Gilley 
2009; Rothstein 2009). Traditionally, the essential sources of democratic support and 
legitimacy have all been closely related to the input-side of the political system. Thus, the 
defining characteristics of democratic governance include typical input-related aspects such as 
freedom of speech and elective and accountable representative politicians. These democratic 
features of government reproduce popular support and legitimacy of the political system 
(Gilley 2006, 2009). 
Today, we observe how the conventional model of representative democracy is challenged by 
changes in the organizational structure and modus operandi of the public sector (see for 
example Brewer 2007). Devolution, outsourcing, private companies delivering public 
services, and collaborative forms of governance such as networks and partnerships, 
increasingly displace political control and weaken the linkage between popular collective 
preferences and policy output. The linkage between the ‘demos’ and actual system output has 
been argued to have become more indirect, as elected politicians do not necessarily constitute 
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the core of the political system, as the logic of representative democracy stipulates (Crozier 
2010). Thus, the conventional model of input-based democracy is challenged, partially by 
political reform driven by politicians, and partially by new modes of governance brought 
about as responses to increased social complexity.  
Against this backdrop, this article will investigate to what extent, and within which contexts, 
political legitimacy generated at the output-side of the political system is more important for 
citizens than legitimacy originating in the input-side, as a consequence of this development. 
By disentangling the concept of democratic legitimacy, we investigate how local government 
is legitimized not only through procedural democracy and participation, but also through 
performance in terms of service delivery and decision-making. Understanding the sources of 
political legitimacy and how that legitimacy is related to the procedures and the performance 
of local government is essential to the academic understanding of contemporary democracy as 
well as to the depiction of popular participation and involvement in governance and public 
management reform. We conduct this study as a comparison between Norway and Sweden. 
The two countries are ideally suited for a ‘most similar systems’ research design (Przeworski 
1987), given the similarities between the two countries’ local political systems and welfare 
state models. 
More specifically, then, the article seeks to uncover the empirical relationship between 
procedural and performance-based legitimacy. To repeat the theoretical framework of the 
paper, while performance intuitively is a source of legitimacy, this very foundation of 
legitimacy has traditionally been regarded as a less important or as a supplementary source of 
legitimacy to the procedural dimension of legitimacy which is provided by the representative 
process and due process. With New Public Management reforms and the growing popularity 
of new modes of governance involving private sector actors or NGOs, conventional 
mechanisms sustaining procedural legitimacy have increasingly become more indirect, and 
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perhaps even less relevant than previously. This observation, which is well documented in the 
Scandinavian Power and Democracy studies (Østerud and Selle 2006; Goul Andersen 2006; 
Amnå 2006), further raises the question of to what extent performance-based legitimacy can 
compensate for the lack of legitimacy which originates in the input-side of the policy circle.  
From a theoretical point of view, however, one can imagine three different forms of 
relationships between procedural and performance-based legitimacy. We label these 
relationships as trade-off, synergy or independence. 
The research design is cross-national and cross-sectoral. The paper draws on surveys among 
representative samples of the population in Norway and Sweden towards two local 
government service sectors: elderly care and building and planning services. The reason for 
choosing these sectors for inquiry is that they represent different tasks for local government. 
Elderly care – and welfare services in general – has traditionally been regarded as a core 
responsibility for local governments in Norway and Sweden and represents a salient political 
issue. Building and planning policies, on the other hand, is less subject to political control as 
decisions and execution of these increasingly has been transferred to private actors and 
networks. Hence, the distance between those who shape and those who execute policies can 
be regarded as larger in the case of building and planning policies than for elderly care 
services, which we expect may create different attitudes towards legitimacy as far as citizens 
are concerned. The Norway-Sweden comparison taps into partially different institutional 
arrangements such as local autonomy, but also differences with regard to the extent of New 
Public Management reform. Moreover, Swedish municipalities are considerably bigger in 
population than Norwegian municipalities (population average in Sweden is 30200 to be 
compared with 11000 in the Norwegian case (Loughlin, Hendriks, and Lidström 2011). 
Furthermore, comparing elderly care services with the planning and building sector has a 
theoretical dimension as well. Care of the elderly has increasingly come to involve for-profit 
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organizations such as contractors, particularly in bigger municipalities, and to a greater extent 
in Sweden than in Norway. In both countries, this is one of the most cost- and labour-
intensive service sectors. By contrast, planning and building is a complex sector in which the 
main role of the local authority is to ensure due process. Beyond that, planning is 
characterized by institutionalized negotiation where private actors and capital play important 
roles. Finally, these processes frequently take place within networks.   
We expect these differences to produce different outcomes in terms of legitimacy patterns, 
cross-nationally and across the two service sectors. Our presumption is that output-based 
legitimacy will be more significant than input-based legitimacy for the case of elderly care 
services, whereas the opposite pattern will characterize citizens’ attitudes in the planning and 
building sector. We further expect performance-based legitimacy to be comparatively more 
important in the Swedish local authorities due to the more extensive NPM-reforms which 
have been implemented there.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a review of the 
extensive theoretical literature which discusses the concept of legitimacy, its sources and the 
relationship between them. This section concludes with a presentation of three previously 
explained hypotheses. To continue, since legitimacy is a theoretical as well as a latent 
concept, measuring legitimacy in not an intuitive task. Section three presents and elaborates 
on a set of proxies based on survey items on how people evaluate different kind of means for 
influencing local politics. Section four presents our data analysis, and finally, we conclude the 
article with a brief summary of our major findings and a discussion about their implications. 
2. On legitimacy 
According to Gilley (2006, 502) legitimacy “is an endorsement of the state by citizens at a 
moral or normative level.” It is conceptually distinct from political support which can be 
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related either to the state or to the current government. The very core of legitimacy, 
understood as an individual quality,1 is that citizens are willing to accept decisions and actions 
by the state even if they do not correspond with individual preferences or objectives (Beetham 
1991). 
Even if the phenomenon can be fairly delimited and defined, the literature and perspectives on 
legitimacy are manifold and complex. In an extensive analysis, Gilley (2009) distinguishes 
between five different schools, based on how they understand the processes which provide 
legitimacy. First, there is the point of view that sources of legitimacy are non-universal, and 
vary across time and space. Positioned in this ‘particularistic school’, any attempt to 
generalize about the sources of legitimacy would be fruitless. The remaining four schools 
share a belief to some extent of universalism in the sources of legitimacy, but these sources 
vary. In the ‘sociological school,’ the emphasis is on social and cultural conditions which give 
rise to positive sentiments about the state. These conditions can be related to deeper values 
such as religion, social trust, social capital, or a national feeling of ‘happiness,’ but also more 
action-oriented characteristics such as the level of political engagement and political interest 
are among the aforementioned sources. 
Moving on to the ‘developmental school,’ legitimacy is regarded as originating in the 
organization, production and distribution of material well-being in a society. In this 
perspective, short- and medium-term fluctuations in economic growth can effect perceptions 
of legitimacy. To continue, the ‘democratic school’ represents the dominating strand of 
thoughts. The key source of legitimacy is the extent to which states uphold an extensive 
system of human rights, including civil, political, physical and social rights. Finally, Gilley 
identifies a ‘bureaucratic school,’ according to which legitimacy is derived from the strength, 
effectiveness and due procedures of state institutions.  
                                                          
1 Legitimacy has also been discussed from a system-level perspective, which is not discussed here. 
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The literature demonstrates various conceptions concerning how to interpret observed societal 
changes and how to understand the relative importance and the relationship between 
procedural and performance-based legitimacy. Hechter (2009) argues that the key determinant 
of the legitimacy of a state is the perceived fairness of the decision-making process rather than 
its provision of resources, opportunities, and outcomes. Guy Peters (2010), however, argues 
that there has been a shift from input-oriented forms of democracy (procedural) towards a 
form of democracy which is more tied to the outputs of policy-making (performance).  
Legitimacy is integral to societal consent with the exercise of political power. In the spirit of 
liberal democratic theory, traditional models of democratic governance tie political power to 
elective offices and to democratic accountability (Pinto, Magalhãs, and Sousa 2012; Dahl 
1989). In this institutional arrangement, public bureaucracy and sub-national governments 
have the implementation of policy as their main responsibility. These roles which have been 
assigned to elected officials and political and administrative institutions are constitutional and 
normative; they define jurisdictions and institutional capabilities. While there is a profound 
normative stability in these arrangements, the empirical and analytical adequacy of this model 
is, however, a matter of empirical inquiry (Crozier 2010). 
To continue, procedural legitimacy is derived from the legality of the public administration 
and due process (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Citizens, in this perspective, have confidence 
in the public bureaucracy because it serves the goals of equal treatment in services and the 
public interest. Legitimacy related to performance is the result of the quality of services which 
are delivered; recipients support public services provided that they are satisfied with the 
quality of these.  
The proliferation of collaborative governance arrangements such as public-private 
partnerships and networks has gradually transformed the modus operandi of government at 
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the same time as its traditional normative role in democratic governance has remained largely 
intact (Pierre 2009). Similarly, New Public Management reform with its emphasis on 
organizational efficiency and managerial autonomy has challenged the traditional model of 
political control and accountability (Peters and Pierre 2011). There has also been significant 
reform undertaken to empower public service clients vis-à-vis public service institutions, e.g. 
in the form of quasi-markets and customer-choice models of service delivery (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011). All these developments are conducive to increasing performance-related 
legitimacy. 
More importantly in the present context, NPM reform in many countries and service sectors 
has provided clients of public services with opportunities to select between competing service 
producers, thus opening up an arena for the articulation of popular preferences at the output-
side of the political system. If we assume that increased client influence on services brings 
about more tailored services, then there are also reasons to suspect that this will increase 
performance-based legitimacy.  
However, there are several important aspects of the relationship between service delivery and 
legitimacy of political institutions that must be taken into account. First, while NPM reform 
may enhance satisfaction with service delivery, it also raises the question of whose 
legitimacy—the private contractor or the public bureaucracy—will benefit from market-based 
public service delivery. Peters suggests that “as government loses control over functions 
considered to be public, it may lose the ability to effectively direct the society; it may lose the 
steering ability that constitutes the root of what we call government” (Peters 2008, 379). To 
put this slightly differently, if NPM reform leads to greater customer satisfaction with services 
that, to smaller or greater extent, are no longer delivered by the public sector, how will this 
affect the legitimacy of political or administrative institutions?  
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Secondly, and partly related to the previous comment, NPM reform and the customer-based 
model of service delivery has strengthened one type of accountability at the same time as it 
has weakened the more conventional form of accountability. As Brewer (2007, 555) argues, 
“the consumerist model is based on a narrow perspective of what constitutes public 
accountability. By placing too much attention on customer satisfaction, important values of 
fairness and due process, which are fundamental to good governance and the citizenship 
status of individuals in their societies, may be undermined.” Hence, while customer 
satisfaction might be a valid measure of performance-related legitimacy, it says very little 
about procedural legitimacy. Therefore, while NPM reform may strengthen performance-
based legitimacy, we need to know to what degree it has an impact on the procedural 
legitimacy of the state. The bottom-line issue appears to be that while customer satisfaction 
and trust in service providers are not necessarily related to the public or private sector, 
procedural legitimacy remains critical to the public sector and cannot be transferred to for-
profit organizations (Pesch 2008; Peters 2008). 
Finally, we are unaware of the relationship between these two dimensions of legitimacy. It 
may be argued from a theoretical point of view that it is a negative relationship between them; 
bureaucracies which prioritize due process may not be very inclined to tailor services to 
individual preferences; hence the prospect of performance-based legitimacy would appear to 
be low. We can raise a similar argument that bureaucracies which emphasize quality and cost-
efficiency in service delivery are likely to adopt managerial models of administration, and 
extensive managerial autonomy does not go very well with an organizational model which 
prioritizes due process (see Moore 1995).  
Summing up, little is known about the relationship between the two dimensions of legitimacy. 
In the following argument, we attempt to empirically analyze and test the following three 
hypothesis concerning procedures and performance: 
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1. Trade-off (negative relationship): If there is a trade-off between the two dimensions of 
legitimacy, we should expect that citizens who value performance-based legitimacy will do so 
at the expense of their evaluations of procedural legitimacy, and vice versa. One possible 
backdrop for such a relationship can occur in a case when local government seeks to 
maximize participation or give priority to due democratic processes. In such a process, local 
governments are expected not to place issues such as responding to individual preferences and 
tailoring services to clients’ needs very high on the agenda, which creates a situation where 
one dimension of legitimacy is enhanced at the expense of the other. On the other hand, if 
local governments seek to maximize effective problem solving and to tailor services, there is 
likely to be less attention on promoting citizen participation and traditional bureaucracy. To 
refer to the former hypothesis, such an argument has been raised in the discussion about the 
state of democracy in the EU, arguing that increasing procedural legitimacy in EU may 
impinge on its decision-making efficiency and its legitimacy following from performance 
(Lindgren and Persson 2010: 450). The trade-off model is a recognition of the fact that 
information and steering cannot flow both upwards and downwards in the local government 
organization at once, i.e. that local government cannot cater to empowered citizens/voters and 
customers at the same time. Strong political and bureaucratic control curtails the power of 
customers, just as empowering customers and managers is expected to equal less emphasis on 
the steering role of elected officials and the democratic process.  
2. Synergy (positive relationship): A synergetic relationship implies that the two sources of 
legitimacy are mutually reinforcing. If this is the case, any reforms or changes aiming to 
increase performance-based legitimacy will also lead to an increase in procedural legitimacy, 
and vice versa. Synergy could be the outcome of a growing awareness in local government 
that all aspects of democracy which citizens respond to, must be promoted. By vitalizing the 
urban democratic discourse, we expect participation as well as involvement on the output-side 
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of the political system to increase. We would thus assume that synergy is the effect of a third 
and latent variable which affects both dimensions of legitimacy.  
 3. Independence (no relationship): A third possible outcome of our analysis is that the two 
sources are independent from each other, and that citizens perceive no relationship between 
the two. The argument behind this hypothesis presumes that input- and output-based 
legitimacy are different, however, not necessarily unrelated, phenomena, and that the actual 
sources of each dimension of legitimacy are different. Input-based legitimacy is derived from 
political representation and accountability, whereas output-based legitimacy is derived from 
customers’ relations to public services. Citizens are expected to be able to be dissatisfied with 
their elected politicians, but still appreciate the services they receive, or vice versa. 
We do not have a strong presumption about which hypothesis should receive the strongest 
support from the data. There is no reason to expect a uniform pattern across institutional 
levels, national contexts, or policy sectors. This study assumes that national context, 
evaluation of participation as well as qualities of policy sectors will influence the results.  
3. Methods and data  
If the overall assumption about a change in the sources of legitimacy is rooted in an empirical 
world, we are aware that we encounter methodological challenges in our endeavours to 
measure these sources. While a review of the literature on political legitimacy culminates in a 
vast number of approaches to measure procedural legitimacy, the measurement of 
performance-based legitimacy has been subject to the attention of academics to a lesser 
extent. However, we may argue that there are conceptual difficulties with several suggested 
approaches to measure procedure-based legitimacy as well, which have to be taken into 
account when designing a research framework.  
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One plausible departure for measuring legitimacy is to ask citizens to which degree they 
experience that they trust the government and elected officials. Other meaningful proxies can 
be transparency of local politics, accountability of officials, whether local parties are able to 
tap into ordinary people’s desires and needs, citizen’s experiences of political alienation, and 
responsiveness of local politicians. Support can then be specified in subsequent survey items 
to measure perceptions of performance-based legitimacy as well; do people trust that local 
government will provide adequate services; how do they perceive the quality of the 
administration; and to which degree do they find that bureaucrats are responsive and 
accountable? 
All these suggestions are examples of proxy variables, hence, variables which one can 
assume, by empirical evidence or theoretical reasoning, are able to express latent variables, 
such as the extent to which one finds a service to be legitimate. In this paper, we assume that 
there is a relationship between how people understand legitimacy and how they assess 
different kinds of means of influencing urban policies and services. We will therefore 
distinguish between procedure- and performance-related means of influence as proxy 
variables for procedural and performance-based legitimacy as. Procedural means of influence 
are related to the input-side of the policy process, and include voting in elections, personal 
contact with elected politicians, as well as expressing views via media or engage in 
demonstrations. These means all belong to traditional democratic channels and constitute 
conventional means of influencing decision-making processes, and following Hirschman’s 
well-known categorization of means of citizen influence, they correspond to voice 
(Hirschman 1970). Performance-related means are more strongly related to the production of 
services or regulation by public authorities, and, in our survey, include actions such as 
choosing between services, contacting bureaucrats in leading positions and contacting people 
who work within the service of interest. These means express voice to some extent, but there 
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is also an element of exit involved in the action of choosing a service: a citizen may attempt to 
influence a service by choosing to exit a service s/he is not satisfied with and choose another 
option. What these means have in common is that they refer to the process of implementation 
of policies and services. 
Naturally, our specification of proxy variables can be criticized. To begin with, our choice to 
apply measures of internal efficacy as tools to measure the legitimacy of local governments 
can be criticised on the conceptual level, and critics may argue that this single measure does 
not fully address the issue of the legitimacy of the system as a whole; it only allows us to say 
something about people’s ability to influence policies and services. With this is mind, it is 
necessary to specify that we are aware that there are limitations to this measure, however, we 
presume that being able to influence a service is a precondition for the service, and the 
authorities which deliver it, to be regarded as legitimate. Referring to Easton’s (1965) 
specification of diffuse and specific support, we posit that citizen’s perception of internal 
efficacy is a necessity for diffuse support; hence, one will not support local government unless 
one believes that one can influence the services it delivers. 
To measure these dimensions of influence, citizen surveys were conducted in Sweden and 
Norway. The two surveys contain identical questions in the two respective languages. The 
Norwegian citizen survey was conducted by Responsanalyse who distributed the survey by e-
mail to respondents. The survey was sent to 29842 respondents as part of an omnibus, and 
3014 responses were returned. The questions included background variables such as age, sex, 
and location, and the main body of the survey included questions about satisfaction with 
elderly care, building and planning policies and primary school services. The survey also 
asked respondents to rate the degree to which they believed they were able to influence local 
services through a selection of hypothetic measures. The Swedish citizen survey contained the 
same questions, but was part of a much larger survey conducted by the SOM-institute at 
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University of Gothenburg. The data set includes answers from 6289 respondents, however, 
some questions contain ample numbers of missing values. The two data sets were merged to a 
final dataset, and a dummy variable for country was created. 
 
Table 1: Sources of data 
 Citizen survey Sweden Citizen survey Norway 
Method Survey by post/e-mail Survey by e-mail 
N  6289 3014  
Collected when Autumn 2012 Spring 2012 
 
 
4. Analysis 
Table 2 reports how the informants evaluate different means when influencing local policies. 
This was measured by asking each informants to indicate the importance of each means of 
influence on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (very bad opportunities) to 5 (very good 
opportunities). The median value of 3 represents a neutral view (neither good nor bad).  
 
Table 2: Average score on evaluation on whether elderly care and building and planning 
policies can be influenced through a selection of means. Scale 1-5, standard deviation in 
brackets. 
  Citizens Norway/Sweden 
 
 
 Elderly care Building/ 
planning 
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Procedure-related 
means of influence  
Voting in local elections2 2.91 (1.08) 2.47 (1.16) 
Contacting a local politician 2.73 (1.05) 2.70 (1.11) 
Contacting the media 3.44 (1.05) 3.40 (1.04) 
Part. in a demonstration 2.65 (1.06) 2.76 (1.12) 
Average 2.93 2.83 
   
 
 
Performance-related 
means of influence 
Exit: Choosing service/ move away 3.11 (1.06) 2.54 (1.39) 
Contacting a bureaucrat 3.04 (1.07) 2.69 (1.09) 
Contacting people who work with the 
actual services 
3.08 (1.08) 2.69 (1.10) 
Average 3.07 2.64 
   
N (lowest) 3583 3337 
 
As can be seen from table 2, respondents have higher average scores on elderly care than on 
building and planning. Especially performance-based means of influence are lower for 
building and planning than for elderly care services. The single most highly evaluated mean 
of influence, independent of policy field, is to contact the media. Moreover, it is worth noting 
that the very conventional ‘input channels’ of voting and contacting politicians are not among 
the most highly rated means. Even if the differences are modest, the table shows that means 
related to the process of implementation, i.e. performance-based means, are regarded as more 
                                                          
2 The questions were phrased as follows: Imagine that you or someone in your close family need help from the municipal 
elderly care and support services. How would you rate your possibilities to influence the services for the elderly through the 
following actions? /Imagine that you will become negatively affected by a building project which is being planned in your 
municipality. How would you rate your possibilities to influence the project through the following actions…? a) Voting at the 
local elections, b) Contacting a local politician, c) Contacting administrative staff who work with elderly care services, d) 
Contacting people who work with elderly care services, e) Contacting the media, f) Participate in demonstrations, or write 
comments on the internet, g) (alt. for elderly care only) Actively choosing which services to receive/ (alt. for building and 
planning only) Moving away from the municipality. 
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important than the means related to procedure when it comes to elderly care services (except 
the media-variable), but the pattern is the opposite for building and planning policies, for 
which the respondents rate procedure-based means of influence higher. 
The overall impression is that Norwegians and Swedes do not place high confidence in their 
own ability to influence policies in general. Respondents’ values generally lie under the 
neutral value of 3, with the exception of contacting the media and the performance-based 
means of influencing elderly care policies. The reasons for this may be related to the general 
trend of decreasing political trust and experiences of low personal efficacy which were noted 
in the Power and Democracy studies which we referred to previously, however, our data only 
measure the ability to influence two selected policy areas through a limited selection of 
means, so we need to be careful when drawing such conclusions. Citizens may believe that 
they are more able to influence either other policy areas and/or through different means of 
influence than those which are specified in this study.  
The next step in our analysis is to focus on the relationship between procedural and 
performance-based means of influence. In order to explore this relationship, we have chosen 
to define performance-based means of influence as the dependent variable, and procedural 
means as an independent variable. The relationship between the two dimensions of means of 
influence will then be explored in a regression analysis, along with a set of control variables 
and satisfaction with the respective services. Before presenting the regression models, we note 
that the measures of input- and output-based means of influenced are highly correlated: 
Pearson’s r is 0.53 for elderly care and 0.63 for building and planning policies. 
In order to obtain general measures for the two dimensions of legitimacy, we summarized the 
variables as shown in table 2 into additive indexes. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) of the two indexes which are used in table 3 are 0.64 (procedure) and 0.72 
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(performance), and the coefficient for the indexes used in table 4 are 0.74 (procedure) and 
0.53 (performance), indicating that survey responses on the items which form the indexes are 
internally consistent, possibly except from the latter figure, which signifies that responses 
vary to a greater extent than on the other indexes. A t-test which tests the differences between 
the mean values of the two indexes also reveals that the differences are significant at the 0.000 
level, for both policy areas. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) between the 
input- and the outputindexes is 0,53 for elderly care and 0,63 for building and planning 
services, which indicates that there is a relatively strong correlation between the two 
dimensions of legitimacy, for both policy areas. Table 3 presents the model for elderly care, 
which has been specified using forward stepwise regression in order to control for changes in 
the model statistics as we introduce more variables.  
Table 3: Determinants for performance-based means of influence for elderly care (proxy for 
performance-based legitimacy) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 3.833**** 2.414*** 3.121*** 2.999*** 
Procedural means of influence in elderly 
care 
.455*** .393*** .392*** .395*** 
Satisfaction with elderly care  .655*** .675*** .686*** 
Sex (Female = 1)   - - 
Age   -.014*** -.015*** 
Education   - - 
Country (S=1)    .296** 
     
N 2397 2397 2397 2397 
Adj. R2 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.36 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Method: forward stepwise regression. Variables excluded from 
parameters, due to sig >0.05 are marked with a -. 
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The first model displays a simple bivariate regression model with performance-based means 
of influence as the dependent variable and the equivalent index for procedure-based means as 
the independent variable. The result demonstrates that there is a clear and positive relationship 
between the two. This effect is statistically significant and relatively strong; a one-unit 
increase in the evaluation of procedural means results in almost half a unit increase in the 
evaluation of performance-based means. Procedure-based means of influence alone explains 
28 percent of the overall variance on performance-based means of influence, which 
contributes to our impression that there is a strong relationship between the two indexes. 
In the second model, we introduced satisfaction with elderly care as a control variable, for two 
reasons. First of all, we wish to explore whether introducing this variable can increase the 
explanatory effect of the model, and secondly, we expect that there should be a relationship 
between evaluations of how well elderly care services function and the ability to influence the 
service. This is a further indication of how respondents evaluate the overall legitimacy of the 
service. The analysis in model 2 reveals that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between satisfaction and the evaluation of performance-based means. It is worth noting that 
the introduction of satisfaction decreases the effect of procedural means introduced in the first 
model with approximately half a unit, while the R2 in model 2 is markedly higher with .07 
percent.   
In model 3, we wish to test whether personal characteristics such as sex, age and education 
can explain people’s evaluation of performance-based means of influence. The results reveal 
that sex and education do not have significant effects and hence are excluded from the model, 
however, age makes a slight difference. The higher the age, the lower respondents value 
performance-based means of influence, but only to a very small degree. Focusing on 
procedural means of influence, it is worth mentioning that the introduction of personal 
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characteristics does not decrease the effect procedural means have on performance-based 
means in model 2, and the overall explanatory effect of the model only increases marginally.  
In our fourth model, we have introduced country as a dummy-variable. The effects of the 
previously introduced variables remain largely unchanged, as well as the R2. However, a 
country effect is visible; Swedes’ evaluations on whether they can influence elderly care 
services via performance-based means is a third of a unit higher than that of Norwegians. This 
will be more thoroughly discussed after we have presented the equivalent results for building 
and planning policies. 
Proceeding to building and planning, table 4 presents regression estimates of the impact of 
procedural means of influence on performance-based means in the context of building and 
planning policies.  
 
Table 4: Determinants for performance-based means of influence in building and planning 
(proxy for performance-based legitimacy) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 2.716*** 2.392*** 3.002*** 3.120*** 
Procedural means of influence in 
building/planning 
.464*** .451*** .453*** .444*** 
Satisfaction with building/planning  .153*** .162*** .180*** 
Sex (Female = 1)   -0.260** -0.250** 
Age   -.010*** -.010*** 
Education   - - 
Country (S=1)    -.352*** 
     
N 2352 2352 2352 2352 
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Adj. R2 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Method: forward stepwise regression. Variables excluded from 
parameters, due to sig >0.05 are marked with a -. 
 
In the bivariate analysis in model 1, we observe that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between the respective indexes, and the R2 informs that procedure-based means 
of influence alone explains 38 percent of the variance on performance-based means, which is 
higher than for elderly care. The coefficient for procedural means is close to the 
corresponding coefficient in table 3; a one-unit increase in procedural means results in almost 
half a unit increase on the dependent variable. 
Introducing satisfaction with building and planning policies in model 2, we note that the effect 
satisfaction with the service has on performance-based means is much weaker for building 
and planning than for elderly care, however, it is statistically significant. We also note that the 
R2 remains unchanged from the first model, which reveals that adding satisfaction to the 
model does not increase its explanatory effect on the dependent variable.  
We note in the third model that the effects of these variables are only slightly different to the 
equivalent model for elderly care; education is also not significant for building and planning, 
and age has a weak and negative effect on the evaluation of performance-based means. Sex is 
significant in this model, but the effect is not very strong; women tend to have a little lower 
faith than men that they can influence policies via performance-based means.  Moreover, the 
explanatory effect of the model only increases with .01. 
In the fourth model, we find that while the effect of Sweden was positive in the case of elderly 
care services, it is negative for building and planning; Swedes are less likely than their 
Norwegian counterparts to believe that they can influence building and planning policies via 
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performance-based means of influence. These are interesting findings which will be addressed 
in the following paragraphs. 
Summing up the analysis for elderly care and building and planning, satisfaction has the 
single strongest effect upon the evaluation of performance-based means of influence when it 
comes to elderly care, while the index for procedure-based means of influence is the variable 
with the single strongest effect for building and planning policies. Except for education, we 
note that personal characteristics only contribute a little to explaining the variance on the 
dependent variables. However, the most important finding to note in this respect is that there 
is a clear indication of a positive connection between the evaluation of procedural means of 
influencing policies and the equivalent evaluation of performance-based means, for both 
policy areas, as well as the effect of the Swedish dummy-variable which is positive for elderly 
care and negative for building and planning.  
To begin with the effect of procedure-based means of influence, following the argument that 
these variables can be interpreted as proxies for legitimacy, as argued in the preceding 
section, this analysis finally suggests that the relationship between procedural and 
performance-based legitimacy is synergetic. If respondents’ evaluations of procedure-based 
means of influence increase, so do their evaluations of performance-based means. If there was 
a negative effect of one variable on the other while other relevant variables were controlled 
for, we would have expected the relationship to resemble a trade-off: when preferring one 
dimension of legitimacy, it would have been at the expense of the other. If there was no 
significant relationship, we would have concluded that the relationship was independent; 
evaluations of one dimension of legitimacy have nothing to do with evaluations of the other. 
Hence, our results imply that the relationship between these two is synergetic and mutually 
enforcing. The reasons for this synergetic effect may simply be that people evaluate both 
dimensions of legitimacy as important and find that they complement each other. Following 
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this logic, we may argue that citizens do not necessarily distinguish between dimensions of 
legitimacy on the conceptual level.  
However, the differences in country effect are well worth exploring; Swedes are more likely 
than Norwegians to believe they can influence elderly care policies than Norwegians, and less 
likely to consider that they can influence building and planning policies via performance-
based means. Reasons for this may be associated with the contextual differences in 
implementation of services and municipal size between the countries. NPM-based principles 
have been implemented to a greater extent in Swedish than in Norwegian elderly care 
services; Swedes are exposed to user-choice and private contractors in elderly care to a 
greater extent than Norwegians, which may be the reasons that Swedes are more likely to 
believe that they can influence the service via performance-based means. However, for 
building and planning services, in both countries, decision-making often takes place within 
networks which are located outside the traditional political system, and citizens may perceive 
these networks as diffuse and/or difficult to access. It appears plausible that such networks 
will be perceived as more difficult to locate and access in large municipalities, and given that 
Swedish municipalities are much bigger than in Norway, this may apply to Swedes to a 
greater extent than to Norwegians.  
 
5. Conclusion 
By understanding people’s evaluation of different means of influence as a proxy for 
legitimacy, the above analysis has demonstrated that perceptions of legitimacy rooted in both 
procedure and performance of local government exists among citizens in the two 
Scandinavian countries. In average, performance-based legitimacy appears to be regarded as 
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more important for respondents in the case of elderly care, while procedural legitimacy is 
valued as more important in the case of building and planning policies. 
 
The main aim of this paper was to provide an empirical test of the relationship between the 
two dimensions of legitimacy. In section 2, three hypotheses which can be argued to 
characterize the relationship between the two dimensions of legitimacy were defined, more 
specifically as trade-off, synergy and independence respectively. The analysis has 
demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between the two dimensions of legitimacy, 
which indicates that the relationship between these appears to be synergetic, or mutually 
reinforcing.  
This observation is surprising to some extent, given common arguments in the theoretical 
literature about the democratic effects of NPM-reforms. Some of these arguments, referred to 
in the theoretical discussion above, should imply that the relationship is closer to a trade-off 
that synergetic. One possible explanation is that the synergy is an outcome of a growing 
awareness in local governments that all aspects of democracy must be promoted, and that 
traditional participation as well as involvement at the output-side has received attention 
among reformers and leaders and citizens alike.  
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